Presentation Material
Abstract
The increase of cyberattacks using IoT devices has exposed the vulnerabilities in the infrastructures that make up the IoT and have shown how small devices can affect networks and services functioning. This talk presents a review of the vulnerabilities that bear the IoT and assessing the experiences in implementing RF attacks targeting the Internet of Things and analyses various facets of the IoT centricity of future military operations based on the IoT concept, IoT-led future shaping of the things, challenges, and developmental trajectories of major powers.
AI Generated Summary
This presentation addresses the critical security challenges posed by the Internet of Military Things (IoMT), where vast networks of connected sensors and devices are integrated into modern military operations. The core argument is that the rapid adoption of commercial IoT technology into military systems has created an enormous, poorly secured attack surface, fundamentally undermining operational security.
Key findings highlight that the hardware layer of these devices represents the most vulnerable component. Unlike traditional IT systems, IoMT devices often lack basic security features such as secure boot, hardware-based cryptography, and robust authentication mechanisms. This allows adversaries to exploit physical access, tamper with sensors, inject malicious data at the source, or compromise entire networks through a single vulnerable node. Specific attack vectors discussed include GPS spoofing/jamming, radio frequency (RF) protocol exploitation, and attacks on device firmware and supply chains. The talk emphasizes that perimeter-based security is ineffective in this context; security must be intrinsic to the device hardware itself.
The practical implication is a necessary paradigm shift. Military and critical infrastructure developers must prioritize hardware-rooted security—including secure manufacturing, trusted execution environments, and hardware-based attestation—from the design phase. Traditional IT security models and access control frameworks are insufficient. The talk concludes that achieving true security for IoMT requires a “security-by-design” approach that treats the underlying hardware platform as the foundational trust anchor, not an afterthought. Failure to do so leaves tactical data, soldier safety, and strategic operations exposed to compromise through seemingly mundane connected devices.