Presentation Material
Abstract
The smart enemy attacks you exactly where you think you are safe. Most attacks try and target a server or a service being used by a company. But when the attack targets the very SOAR tool you use to defend your network to break in, things get interesting. Given that SOAR tools would be whitelisted in an organization to be able to capture logs from various servers and devices, the consequences of such vulnerabilities being exploited are far-reaching. On successful exploitation, either by the methods we’ve shown or from some other similar vectors, it would result in the complete compromise of the network as well as internal devices and services which are often present in large corporate networks. It also foreshadows future attacks via log poisoning on SOCs and SOAR tools that make use of LLMs such as ChatGPT leading to possible prompt injections.
AI Generated Summary
The presentation examined Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR) tools as critical pivot points within enterprise networks. The core argument is that these tools, designed to automate security responses, become high-value targets; if compromised, an attacker can leverage the SOAR’s trusted, broad access to move laterally across segregated network segments and internal services.
A key finding was a critical remote code execution vulnerability in the open-source SOAR platform Shuffler. The flaw existed in its workflow engine, which used the Liquid templating engine to substitute user-supplied webhook parameters into shell scripts before execution. This allowed an attacker to inject arbitrary commands via a crafted request, achieving a reverse shell. The exploit was demonstrated, showing that the compromised workflow executed with root privileges inside an isolated Docker container, enabling potential container escape or host compromise. The practical impact is severe: a SOAR tool is typically whitelisted and its logs trusted, making malicious activity difficult to detect.
The talk emphasized that security teams often exhibit implicit trust in their tools without validating their own security posture. A “break-glass” plan for tool compromise is frequently absent. Furthermore, cross-domain knowledge gaps between development, DevOps, and security personnel can lead to overlooked flaws in security tooling. Finally, the speakers warned against prematurely integrating large language models (LLMs) into security operations (e.g., replacing SOC analysts) due to the current lack of understanding of their behavior and susceptibility to prompt injection attacks, which could cause catastrophic, unauthorized actions. The overarching takeaway is that security tools themselves must be rigorously secured, as their compromise subverts the entire defensive architecture.