Abstract

Memory corruption, a vulnerability that emerged in the 1980s and gained prominence with the discovery of the first buffer overflow in the fingerd Unix application exploited by the Morris worm in 1988, has since become a significant concern in the field of security. Its prevalence was further underscored by the influential Phrack edition 49 titled “Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit” in 1996. Today, memory corruption remains one of the most pressing security challenges, compelling the entire defensive security industry to develop robust countermeasures. This session aims to delve into the progress made by the security industry in mitigating and protecting against different types of memory corruption, as well as the current state of these efforts.

During the talk, I will explore various techniques that have been introduced worldwide to safeguard against and mitigate memory corruptions and their bypasses found over years. Moreover, I will present insightful metrics to gauge the effectiveness of these techniques.

This discussion will be valuable for security researchers and exploit developers seeking to familiarize themselves with existing measures designed to impede the execution of exploits and malicious code in both process and kernel memory. By attending this talk, participants will gain a comprehensive understanding of the advancements made in memory corruption mitigation, equipping them with the knowledge necessary to enhance security practices and proactively address this critical aspect of the cybersecurity landscape.