Presentation Material
Abstract
To meet the massive demand of mobile communications operators are switching to automated networks that could also save time and money for them. Today’s widely deployed LTE networks are equipped with automation features technically referred as Self Organized network (SON) that allows base stations to auto-configure and become operational within no time. Additionally run-time operations are managed and controlled automatically by these base stations.
In this talk, we investigate and discuss SON technology in LTE networks in addition to exploring operational protocols. We identify several vulnerabilities that allows an attacker to disrupt LTE network operations remotely. We demonstrate different methods to exploit these vulnerabilities using low cost tools. Then we share our research methodology and effective usage of low cost software/hardware tools to evaluate attacks in operational LTE networks. Finally we discuss countermeasures for mobile end-users and mobile network operators as well.
AI Generated Summary
This research examines security vulnerabilities in 4G LTE Self-Organizing Networks (SON), automated protocols that allow base stations to configure and optimize themselves without operator intervention. The study identifies fundamental design flaws in three key SON functions: Physical Cell ID (PCI) optimization, Automatic Neighbor Relation (ANR), and the LTE handover process.
The core vulnerability is the blind trust in unverified, over-the-air measurement reports from user equipment. An attacker can exploit this by operating a low-cost rogue base station (using a LimeSDR and open-source SRS LTE software) to broadcast fake cell identities. This enables several attacks: flooding a target base station’s neighbor relation table with bogus entries from distant cells, forcing unnecessary PCI restarts due to false collision reports, and triggering handover failures by reporting non-existent target cells. These actions degrade network performance and can cause localized denial-of-service.
The attacks abuse legitimate SON features present in most LTE networks deployed since 2008 (Release 8). Practical implications include service outages for customers and increased operational burden for operators due to spurious network reconfigurations. The research demonstrates that remote, stealthy disruption of base station operations is possible without compromising user devices or core network elements. The primary takeaway is that automated network optimization protocols require robust verification of input data to prevent manipulation, as their unchecked operation introduces a new attack surface against critical infrastructure.